
Contents
- What are agentic AI security solutions?
- What are the main risks to AI agents?
- Securing AI agents: the core controls
- MCP and tool permissions
- Agentic AI security tools compared
- Vendor notes: what each page says
- How much do agentic AI security tools cost?
- How to choose agentic AI security solutions
- Common AI agent security mistakes
- In short
- Agentic AI security solutions: FAQ
What are agentic AI security solutions?
Agentic AI security solutions are the controls and products that protect AI agents: software that plans, calls tools, reads data and takes actions with limited human input. They cover finding the agents you run, limiting what each one can reach, watching behavior at runtime and testing for attacks.
The need is simple. A chatbot that only answers questions can leak text. An agent with email, file or database tools can change real systems. AI agent security therefore focuses on permissions and actions, not only on what the model says.
If you are still choosing agent platforms, see our enterprise AI software guide. For output filtering and policy layers, see AI guardrails explained.
What are the main risks to AI agents?
Two OWASP lists frame securing AI agents. The OWASP Top 10 for LLM Applications (2025 edition) includes LLM01 Prompt Injection, LLM06 Excessive Agency and LLM10 Unbounded Consumption. The OWASP Top 10 for Agentic Applications, published December 9, 2025, covers autonomous, tool-using agents specifically.
OWASP Top 10 for Agentic Applications
| ID | Risk | What OWASP’s page describes |
|---|---|---|
| ASI01 | Agent Goal Hijack | Hidden instructions redirect an agent’s objectives |
| ASI02 | Tool Misuse | An agent uses legitimate tools to produce harmful outcomes |
| ASI03 | Identity & Privilege Abuse | Leaked credentials let an agent act beyond its intended scope |
| ASI04 | Agentic Supply Chain Vulnerabilities | Runtime components in MCP and A2A ecosystems can be poisoned |
| ASI05 | Unexpected Code Execution | Natural-language execution paths enable remote code execution |
| ASI06 | Memory & Context Poisoning | Corrupted memory alters behavior long after the original interaction |
| ASI07 | Insecure Inter-Agent Communication | Spoofed messages between agents misdirect clusters |
| ASI08 | Cascading Failures | False signals spread through automated pipelines |
| ASI09 | Human-Agent Trust Exploitation | Confident explanations convince operators to approve harmful actions |
| ASI10 | Rogue Agents | Agents show misalignment, concealment or self-directed action |
What NIST says about agent hijacking
NIST’s Center for AI Standards and Innovation (CAISI) describes agent hijacking as a form of indirect prompt injection, where an attacker inserts malicious instructions into data an agent may ingest. In its blog, updated December 19, 2025, CAISI reports that red teaming with the UK AI Security Institute raised the attack success rate from 11% for the strongest baseline attack to 81% for the strongest new attack, against an upgraded Claude 3.5 Sonnet. These are results from one evaluation, not a rate for every agent.
NIST also lists an AI Agent Standards Initiative, created February 17, 2026, whose pillars include research on agent authentication and identity. The page says CAISI sought input on threats and mitigations for securing AI agent systems.
Securing AI agents: the core controls
Most AI agent security starts with controls you can apply without buying anything. OWASP’s Excessive Agency entry names three root causes: excessive functionality, excessive permissions and excessive autonomy. Its prevention list maps to the controls below.
Least privilege for agents
OWASP’s guidance is to offer the agent only the extensions it needs, implement only the functions each one requires and avoid open-ended tools such as a general shell-command runner. It also says to grant downstream access only at the level needed and to run actions in the user’s context with minimum privileges.
Human approval for high-impact actions
OWASP lists requiring user approval, a human-in-the-loop check, for high-impact actions. Its agentic list also includes Human-Agent Trust Exploitation (ASI09), so approval prompts should show the exact action, not only the agent’s explanation.
Complete mediation and input handling
OWASP’s “complete mediation” means enforcing authorization in downstream systems rather than relying on the model to decide what is allowed. It also lists sanitizing LLM inputs and outputs. For prompt injection, OWASP’s page says there is no guaranteed fix and lists constraining model behavior, filtering inputs and outputs, segregating external content and adversarial testing. See AI guardrails for the filtering layer.
Sandboxing and logging
The MCP security page recommends running local MCP servers in a sandbox with minimal default privileges and restricted file system and network access. OWASP says logging, monitoring and rate limiting will not prevent excessive agency but can limit the damage. For tracing agent actions, see best AI observability tools.
MCP and tool permissions
The Model Context Protocol (MCP) connects agents to tools. Its security best practices page, which is a draft specification page, covers several attacks and fixes. Key points as written there:
- Token passthrough: MCP servers must not accept tokens that were not explicitly issued for them.
- Scope minimization: use a progressive, least-privilege model with a minimal initial scope set and targeted step-up when privileged operations are attempted. The page lists wildcard or omnibus scopes as a common mistake.
- Confused deputy: MCP proxy servers must implement per-client consent.
- Local servers: clients must show the exact command and get explicit approval before running a one-click local server configuration.
- SSRF: block private and link-local IP ranges and consider an egress proxy.
In practice, treat every MCP server as code with access to your systems: approve it, scope its tokens and log its calls.
Agentic AI security tools compared
The table lists what each vendor’s own page says. These are vendor descriptions, not test results.
| Tool | What the page says it covers | Published price |
|---|---|---|
| Zenity | Observability, AI security posture management, agentic identity and access management, MCP security, AI detection and response | None shown; demo |
| Noma Security | AI-SPM, runtime AI-DR, agent access control, AI red teaming | None shown; demo |
| Lakera | Workforce AI security, AI agent security (runtime), AI red teaming | None shown; Pricing nav item is a placeholder |
| Prompt Security (SentinelOne) | Page is a resource hub; lists agent-focused tools ClawSec and OneClaw | None shown; demo |
| Microsoft Entra Agent ID and Agent 365 | Agent identities; control plane to observe, secure and govern agents | Agent 365 listed at $15.00 per user/month, paid yearly |
| Cisco AI Defense | Discovery, algorithmic red teaming, runtime guardrails, access policies | None shown; demo |
| Palo Alto Networks Prisma AIRS | AI gateway, red teaming, runtime security, posture, agent identity security | None shown; demo |
| Wiz AI-SPM | AI inventory, misconfiguration checks, attack paths, runtime detection | None shown on that page; demo |
Vendor notes: what each page says
Zenity
Zenity says it “evaluates every agent action in real time and steers it.” Its page lists modules including MCP Security, Boundaries and Agentic Identity and Access Management, and says detection examines tool calls, memory access and data use. It names platforms it covers, such as Microsoft 365 Copilot, Copilot Studio, Amazon Bedrock and Salesforce.
Noma Security
Noma calls itself an “Agent Security & Governance Platform.” It says it discovers agents, MCP servers, skills and tools, and that its access control can approve, review or block them. Its runtime actions include stopping destructive actions, alerting a human, masking data or triggering a killswitch. The Gartner and Fortune 100 statements on its page are Noma’s own claims.
Lakera
Lakera’s page describes runtime protection against prompt attacks and data leakage, plus red teaming it labels “Lakera Red.” It claims sub-50 ms runtime latency, a vendor claim. The page’s footer shows a Check Point copyright, but the page does not state an ownership relationship.
Prompt Security
The page reads as “Prompt Security from SentinelOne.” The homepage I read is mostly resources, with tools aimed at specific agent frameworks. It also lists an open-source prompt fuzzer (ps-fuzz) and an AI usage dashboard, but it did not describe an MCP gateway or a priced platform, and SentinelOne’s product page did not load on a retry, so no platform feature list is given here.
Microsoft Entra Agent ID, Agent 365 and Defender
Microsoft’s Entra documentation says Entra Agent ID provides the platform for agent identities that can act autonomously or on behalf of users. The same page says extending Entra security features to agents requires Microsoft Agent 365. Microsoft’s Agent 365 page describes a registry of agents, least-privilege access control and audit logging, and calls it “Now generally available.”
Defender for Cloud’s AI security posture documentation covers generative AI applications and AI agents (Preview). It says that effective July 1, 2026, agent discovery and agent-level posture for Foundry agents and third-party cloud agents require an Agent 365 license.
A separate Microsoft Defender page describes agent security as part of Agent 365: agent discovery, posture queries, real-time evaluation of tool calls for MCP tools onboarded to Agent 365 (the default rule audits, custom rules can block) and threat detection on Agent 365 telemetry. That page says enabling an Agent 365 license integrates Defender to secure managed agents; it gives no pricing.
Cisco AI Defense
Cisco describes discovery of AI assets, algorithmic red teaming, runtime guardrails against prompt injection and data leakage, and access policies. It says it maps to NIST, MITRE ATLAS and the OWASP LLM Top 10, and that network-level enforcement works “without the need for agents or libraries.”
Palo Alto Networks Prisma AIRS
Prisma AIRS is presented as one platform to discover, assess, protect and govern AI apps, agents and models. Listed modules include AI Gateway, AI Red Teaming, AI Runtime Security, Agent Identity Security and Agentic Endpoint Security. The page says dedicated agent security targets risks such as memory manipulation and tool misuse.
Wiz AI-SPM
Wiz AI-SPM is described as continuous visibility across AI models, agents and services, with an AI bill of materials, misconfiguration rules, attack path analysis and runtime detection of prompt injection and rogue agents. The page says services can be found “without any agents.” It is cloud-focused; the page shows no pricing.
How much do agentic AI security tools cost?
Most agentic AI security tools are sales-led. On the pages read, Zenity, Noma, Lakera, Prompt Security, Cisco, Palo Alto Networks and Wiz showed no prices, only demo or assessment calls to action.
Microsoft is the exception. Its Agent 365 page lists Agent 365 at $15.00 per user/month, paid yearly with an annual commitment, and Microsoft 365 E7 at $99.00 per user/month on the same basis, with Agent 365 included in E7.
Cost example for a 10-person business
If all 10 people were licensed for Agent 365 at the listed $15.00, the arithmetic is $150 a month, or $1,800 a year on the annual commitment. Microsoft’s page says Agent 365 is licensed per user and recommends a license for every user who interacts with, owns, manages or sponsors Agent 365-managed agents, so the number of licensed people depends on your setup; confirm with Microsoft before budgeting. For the other vendors, no cost can be computed from published prices.
How to choose agentic AI security solutions
- List every agent you run, including SaaS copilots, homegrown agents and coding agents on laptops.
- Write down each agent’s tools, data and permissions, then cut anything the task does not need.
- Decide which actions need human approval and make the approval show the exact action.
- Check that a tool covers the platforms you use; vendors name different ones.
- Ask whether the tool enforces policy or only alerts.
- Confirm logging retention and export to your SIEM; see AI observability tools.
- Get pricing in writing, since most vendors do not publish it.
Common AI agent security mistakes
- Giving an agent a broad API key because it was quicker than scoping access.
- Trusting the system prompt to enforce rules; OWASP says authorization belongs in downstream systems.
- Installing MCP servers without reviewing the command they run.
- Using wildcard scopes, which the MCP page lists as a common mistake.
- Approving actions based on the agent’s explanation alone.
- Treating one red-team result as proof the agent is safe; NIST’s blog argues evaluations must keep pace with new attacks.
In short
Agentic AI security solutions work best in layers. Start with least privilege, approvals, sandboxing and logging, mapped to OWASP’s agentic risks. Add dedicated agentic AI security tools when agents spread across SaaS, cloud and endpoints. Expect to ask vendors for pricing, because only Microsoft published one on the pages read.
Sources, as read in November 2026: OWASP LLM Top 10, OWASP LLM06 Excessive Agency, OWASP LLM01 Prompt Injection, OWASP Agentic Top 10, MCP security best practices, NIST CAISI agent hijacking blog, NIST AI Agent Standards Initiative, Zenity, Noma Security, Lakera, Prompt Security, Microsoft Entra Agent ID, Microsoft Agent 365, Defender for Cloud AI security posture, Microsoft Defender AI agent protection, OWASP Agentic Top 10 resource page, Cisco AI Defense, Palo Alto Networks Prisma AIRS, Wiz AI-SPM
Agentic AI security solutions: FAQ
What are agentic AI security solutions?
Agentic AI security solutions are tools and controls that discover AI agents, limit what they can access, watch what they do at runtime and test them for attacks such as prompt injection. They sit alongside basic controls like least privilege, human approval and logging.
What is AI agent security?
AI agent security is the practice of protecting autonomous, tool-using AI systems from being hijacked, misused or over-trusted. OWASP’s Top 10 for Agentic Applications, published December 2025, lists ten such risks, from agent goal hijack to rogue agents.
How do you start securing AI agents?
Give each agent only the tools and permissions its task needs, require human approval for high-impact actions, and log every tool call. OWASP’s Excessive Agency guidance lists these steps, plus enforcing authorization in downstream systems instead of trusting the model.
Which agentic AI security tools publish prices?
Of the vendors read for this guide, only Microsoft publishes a price: Agent 365 is listed at $15.00 per user per month, paid yearly with an annual commitment. Zenity, Noma, Lakera, Cisco, Palo Alto Networks and Wiz showed no prices on the pages read.
Is prompt injection the main risk to AI agents?
It is one of the central risks. NIST’s CAISI describes agent hijacking as a form of indirect prompt injection, and OWASP lists agent goal hijack first in its agentic Top 10. Excessive permissions and unsafe tool use compound the damage.
What does OWASP say about human approval for agents?
OWASP’s Excessive Agency entry lists requiring user approval, meaning human-in-the-loop checks, for high-impact actions. It also says logging, monitoring and rate limiting will not prevent excessive agency but can limit the damage.
How do you secure MCP servers and tool permissions?
The MCP security best practices page says servers must not accept tokens not issued for them and recommends a least-privilege scope model that starts with minimal scopes. For local servers it recommends consent before running commands and sandboxing with restricted file system and network access.
Do I need a dedicated agentic AI security tool?
Not always. A small team with a few agents may start with least privilege, approvals and logging built into its existing platforms. Dedicated tools make more sense once agents multiply across SaaS, cloud and endpoints and you need an inventory and runtime enforcement.




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